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Game theory studies how people should respond in strategic situations and is 
naturally used for predictive purposes. The optimal strategy predictions yielded by game 
theoretic reasoning can be surprising when they conflict with preconceived notions of 
how to play, i.e. the "common sense" strategy. Consequently, the game theoretically 
optimal strategy may be a poor predictor of how individuals actually behave in real-life 
strategic situations. In order to accurately model such situations for predictive purposes it 
is important,to know the limitations of the current game theoretic tools. 
In the traveler's dilemma, Kaushik Basu presents a parable to illustrate how game 
theoretic reasoning and intuition can be at odds. The parable is as follows: Two travelers 
are returning home from a vacation where they purchased identical souvenirs. 1 These 
souvenirs are, of course, routinely destroyed by the airline. The souvenirs were purchased 
with cash in an open-air market and as a result the travelers do not have receipts. The 
airline official in charge of damage claims wants to compensate the travelers fairly but 
has no way of determining the actual purchase price of the souvenirs. In an attempt to 
avoid spurious claims the official proposes a method to determine the amount awarded. 
Each traveler must submit a claim that lies between a known minimum and maximum. 
(The minimum bound can be thought of as that level of claim below which the airline 
never disputes for cost reasons and the maximum bound can be thought of as the most the 
airline' s insurance company would pay absent a special policy). If the claims submitted 
are equal then both receive the amount claimed. However, if traveler 1 submits a lower 
I Theoretically the travelers' relationship doesn't affect their incentives although empirically it may be 
important. 
claim than traveler 2, traveler I is considered "honest" and receives the lower claim plus 
a reward for honesty (ideally in frequent flyer miles thereby ensuring that the airline will 
have an opportunity to destroy those items which it missed on the first pass). Traveler 2 
also receives the lower claim but in addition a symmetric penalty for "lying" is levied. 
Travelers report their claims simultaneously i.e., without knowledge of the other 
traveler's claim. This ensures that simple, collusive agreements cannot be reached 
because any such agreement involves a non-credible promise (the rewards are structured 
such that there it is never in a rational player's best interest to playas he agreed). 
Game theoretic analysis suggests that two rational players will report the 
minimum claim. Moreover, this result is a direct consequence of both players attempting 
to maximize their individual payoff. Adoption of this strategy does not, on the face of it, 
appear to be the best strategy because both players can clearly improve their payoff 
simply by submitting random large claims. 
Kaushik Basu proposed the traveler's dilemma to suggest that Nash equilibria 
may fail to consistently predict behavior in certain situations.2 The traveler's dilemma 
presents a simple allegory that calls into question the predictive ability of Nash equilibria. 
A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile (a list of strategies) such that each player's 
strategy maximizes the player's payoff, assuming that all other players adopt their Nash 
equilibrium strategies. In other words, a Nash equilibrium strategy is a best response to 
the belief that all other players will adopt their Nash equilibrium strategies.3 Nash 
2 Basu, Kaushik. "The Traveler's Dilemma: Paradoxes of Rationality in Game Theory." American 
Economic Review, May 1994, 84(2), pp. 391-394. 
3 Definition taken from Scott Bierman and Luis Fernandez, Game theory with Economic Applications. 2nd 
Edition. Reading: Addison-Wesley-Longman Publishing Co., 1998. 
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equilibrium strategies in this game can be found using the process of iterated deletion of 
dominated strategies. This process is explained in detail below. 
Although widely accepted as an analysis tool, this is not the first time the 
predictive power of Nash equilibria has been questioned. The possibility of multiple 
Nash equilibrium strategies in a given game coupled with the lack of an accepted 
methodology for choosing the "best" among multiple Nash equilibria has long been 
recognized as a limitation.4 The traveler's dilemma, however, is a game with a unique 
Nash equilibrium. Acceptance of Nash equilibrium predictions for games which have 
single Nash equilibrium solutions has been considerably less controversial. The dilemma 
stems from doubts that the equilibrium is intuitive. Basu states: 
"But even knowing this, there is something very rational about rejecting (the Nash equilibrium) 
and expecting your opponent to do the same ... The aim is to explain why, despite rationality being 
common knowledge, players would reject (the Nash equilibrium), as intuitively seems to be the 
case.,,5 
Subsequent research by Monica Capra, Jacob Goree, et. al. has shown that the Nash 
equilibrium prediction can indeed be a poor predictor of strategic play in the traveler's 
dilemma. 
II. Specification of the Problem 
The traveler's dilemma can be formalized as follows. Let the range be the interval 
U, k] (thus j and k are, respectively, the minimum and maximum allowed claims) and the 
reward be R (by assumption the penalty is -R). Denote the claim chosen by traveler i as 
nj and the payoff received by traveler i as Pj. The payoffs are: 
3 
[
Min (n l,n2)+R if n l<n 2] 
Pl= Min \nl,n~ i - R if nen 2 
n 1 If n l=n 2 
[
Min n l,n 2!+R if n2<n 1] 
p 2= Min ,n l' n 2' -R if n 2>n 1 
n 2 If n l=n 2 
The logic of the Nash equilibrium is as follows. Given that both travelers attempt 
to maximize their compensation, suppose that both consider submitting the maximum 
claim ({nl = k, n2 = k} and PI = P2 = k). It is apparent that by submitting a slightly lower 
claim (k - E) the first traveler can undercut the second traveler and earn the reward for 
honesty, resulting in a payoff of PI = (k - E + R) > k.6 This is true because traveler 1 gives 
up a small amount (E) but by undercutting traveler 2 he earns the reward (R). Reporting k 
is never a best response to any report by traveler 2. This logic applies equally well to 
traveler 2 and as a result we can conclude that neither will submit the maximum value. 
Excluding the maximum from the set of best response strategies yields a truncated claim 
spectrum [j, k - E]. The same argument can be repeated on this and all subsequent 
maximum values. By using iterated deletion of dominated strategies the game unravels in 
a manner similar to the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma7 with one important 
difference. The finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma has a dominant strategy equilibrium 
while traveler's dilemma does not. 
4Focal point and Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium have been recognized as standing out among multiple 
Nash equilibrium. Unfortunately focal point equilibria are neither predictable nor "well defined" and 
~areto-optimal equilibria do not always exist when multiple Nash equilibria are present. 
, Ibid. I, pp.393 . 
6 This only holds for R > E. If R:S; E then PI = (nl - E + R) :s; k and the Nash equilibrium is {nl = k, n2 = k}. 
7 A finite series of sequentially repeated prisoner's dilemma games played by the same subjects. 
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The traveler's dilemma is a generalization of the prisoner's dilemma under certain 
conditions. 8 By definition, a prisoner's dilemma is a static, two-player game with perfect 
information in which the strictly dominant strategy equilibrium is Pareto-dominated. 
Consider the game if you restrict the set of possible claims to two distinct values (a and b, 
where a < b). The new game is a prisoner's dilemma if R > b - a. When the game is 
restricted to two distinct claim values it simplifies to a prisoner's dilemma if and only if 
the reward is larger than the difference of the claims. For large enough values of R the 
restricted game will always simplify to a prisoner's dilemma. If R < b - a then the game 
has two Nash equilibrium of which {b, b} is Pareto-dominant. 
Table I 




(a + R, a-R) 
(b, b) 





(a - R, a + R) 
a < b - R < b byassumptior 
The process of iterated deletion of dominated strategies used to find the Nash 
equilibrium in the traveler's dilemma seems quite similar to the process commonly used 
in the finitely repeated prisoner' s dilemma; however, there is a critical difference. The 
traveler's dilemma circumvents some philosophical criticisms leveled against Nash 
equilibrium of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma.9 The fact that the traveler's 
dilemma is free of this flaw is an important issue because this is precisely what allows the 
predictive power of the Nash equilibrium to be rigorously tested. It is therefore important 
to understand the philosophical criticism of the Nash equilibrium in the finitely repeated 
8 Ibid. I, pp. 392. 
9 See for example Pettit, Philip and Sugden, Robert. "The Backward Induction Paradox." Journal of 
Philosophy, April 1989,86(4), pp. 169-182. 
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prisoner's dilemma and why the traveler's dilemma is not affected. Briefly, common 
knowledge of rationality is assumed and then the final node of the game tree or the set of 
actions available during the final round for the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma is 
examin~d. Since there is no penalty incurred by defection ("defection" is cOIIlplonly used 
to denote the individually selfish choice {a} versus "cooperation" towards the potentially 
Pareto-dominant outcome {b, b}) it is assumed that rational players will defect in the last 
round. The key issue is that the assumption of shared rationality in the final node is too 
powerful, that is, it ignores the possibility that non-rational behavior has been 
demonstrated in prior rounds. 
There are many different paths to a final node in the finitely repeated prisoner's 
dilemma and many are logically inconsistent with the assumption of common knowledge 
of rationality in the final node. Only when examining end nodes that follow paths 
wherein both players persistently defect does it make sense to assume common 
knowledge of rationality. Consistent acts of cooperation will result in players being 
unable to reach the Nash equilibrium strategy profile generated through backward 
induction ({ always defect, always defect}) because they have to attribute rationality to the 
other player despite evidence to the contrary. The Nash equilibrium in the traveler's 
dilemma, a static game, is reached using the technique of iterated deletion of dominated 
strategies and therefore does not involve attributing rationality at nodes that cannot be 
reached under the assumption of common knowledge of rationality. Consequently the 
paradoxical nature of the Nash equilibrium in the traveler' s dilemma cannot be dismissed 
on grounds of logical inconsistency. 
6 
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The Nash equilibrium in the traveler's dilemma is induced by the reward. That is, 
a reward is both a necessary and a sufficient condition to drive the equilibrium to the 
minimum claim value. In contrast, a penalty is not only unnecessary it is insufficient to 
drive the equilibrium to the minimum. The best response to any belief about the other 
traveler's claim, when there is only a penalty, is simply to match the other traveler' s 
claim. The incentive to undercut no longer exists and multiple Nash equilibria of the 
form {nJ = i, n2 = i}, i E [j, k], exist of which {nJ = k, n2 = k} is Pareto-dominant. In 
contrast, the Nash equilibrium is unchanged if there is only a reward, and it remains 
independent of the magnitude of that reward. This is easily verified using the same 
technique used earlier when both penalty and reward were present. 
Eliminating the penalty simplifies the traveler's dilemma to the minimum 
conditions necessary to attain the result that Basu desired. Incidentally, it also clears up 
one seeming inconsistency in the parable version of the traveler's dilemma. Is it 
reasonable to assume that an airline can impose a penalty when it is responsible for 
damages? I would argue that it is not, that it is more reasonable to assume that the airline 
may try to induce low claims with a bribe. 10 
III. Previous Experimental Evidence 
Evidence of play inconsistent with the Nash equilibrium strategy has been 
established experimentally by eG. JJ An experiment was designed to test whether the 
magnitude of the penalty/reward had an effect on the average level of claims. Randomly 
10 Unfortunately this slightly changes the static analysis of the restricted traveler's dilemma. Now nl = a 
(seeTable I) is a weakly dominant strategy and {a, a} is a weakly dominant strategy equilibrium. 
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paired subjects were asked to choose a claim within the interval ($.80, $2.00). The 
minimum claimant was punished and the maximum claimant was rewarded as previously 
described. The penalty varied over a range of high, medium, and low values (R = {$.05, 
$.10, $.20,$.25, $.50, $.80}). No mention of the allegory used by Basu was made in order 
to avoid "halo" effects. 
The experiment consisted of six sessions. Each session was divided into two 
parts. Each part allowed ten rounds of playl2 at either a high or a low penalty/reward level 
(every round used a different random pairing of players). The order in which subjects 
were first exposed to a given penalty/reward parameter was reversed in subsequent 
sessions (high, low to low, high and vice versa) to test for a sequence effect. A sequence 
effect can be thought of as the momentum generated through previous experience. For 
example, suppose subjects are familiar with a reward structure that induces low claims. If 
the reward structure is suddenly changed such that it now induces high claims, ceteris 
paribus, subjects have a tendency to submit lower claims than would otherwise be 
expected. The opposite holds when the switch is from low to high. In any given round 
subjects were only informed of the response given by the player with whom they had been 
paired. 
CG found that average claims were inversely related to the magnitude of the 
penalty/reward. When the penalty/reward was sufficiently high (R = $.50, $.80) play 
converged to the Nash equilibrium. At low and medium penalty/reward levels average 
claims were consistently above the Nash equilibrium level. Similarly, for low 
11 Capra, Monica M., Goeree, Jacob K., et al. "Anomalous Behavior in a Traveler's Dilemma?" 
Unpublished, September 1997. 
12 Part B of the first two sessions only allowed five rounds of play. 
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penalty/reward levels the average claim was consistently above that for medium 
penalty/reward levels. Significantly less variation occurred at low penalty/reward levels. 
Evidence of a sequence effect was found. Average claims when the 
penalty/reward value was high in Part B were larger given that the penalty/reward was 
low in Part A than average claims for the same high penalty/reward when it appeared in 
Part A. Similarly, average claims for low penalty/reward values were smaller when 
following a high penalty/reward. 
The experimental evidence is consistent with Basu' s original clam that there is a 
"rational" basis for rejecting the Nash equilibrium when the penalty/reward is small. 
Although Basu did not explicitly consider other penalty/reward levels, he used a relatively 
small R value when proposing the traveler's dilemma. The evidence also supports the 
N ash equilibrium prediction for high levels of R. This is consistent with the static 
analysis of the game when only two claims are considered. Recall that the magnitude of 
the penalty/reward parameter should not in theory have any impact on the Nash 
equilibrium; therefore, evidence of play inconsistent with the Nash equilibrium is 
observed by CG. 
Hypotheses 
HI: Introducing social context in the form of the original the original traveler's dilemma 
parable will cause the average claims to deviate from the Nash equilibrium even in the 
face of a penalty/reward which is sufficiently high to induce the Nash equilibrium in the 
absence of social context. 
The CG study established some important characteristics of the traveler's 
dilemma but left open some interesting avenues for further study. Consider the traveler's 
dilemma as if it were a real situation. If both travelers know the actual purchase price of 
9 
the souvenir it seems reasonable to postulate that it might induce a non-equilibrium 
"sticky point." The sticky point could occur for moral reasons (fairness, honesty, etc.) or 
as a means of tacit coordination. The purchase price is a sunk cost and, as such, should 
be completely discounted. Although the purchase price is strategically irrelevant it could 
be psychologically relevant. Even supposing that the price is not known, would the mere 
fact that the other person is a fellow traveler (let alone a close friend or relative) reduce 
the incentive to undercut? Does the Nash equilibrium hold up against contextual 
incentives when the penalty/reward level is large enough to induce it absent such context? 
Omitting the social context may eliminate critical information. The social context 
is one of the reasons that the parable version of the traveler's dilemma is so successful in 
highlighting the inappropriateness of the Nash equilibrium. Introducing it may reveal that 
the Nash equilibrium is a poor prediction of actual play regardless of the magnitude of the 
penalty/reward. 
H2: If the penalty parameter is eliminated it will still hold that average claims are 
inversely related to the reward parameter. The penalty parameter intensifies the effect of 
the reward. 
To reiterate, the Nash equilibrium in the traveler's dilemma is induced by the 
reward. That is, a reward is both a necessary and a sufficient condition to drive the 
eqUilibrium to the minimum claim value. A penalty is not only unnecessary it is 
insufficient to drive the equilibrium to the minimum. The best response to any belief 
about another traveler's claim when there is only a penalty is simply the other traveler's 
claim. In contrast the Nash equilibrium is unchanged when there is only a reward. 
Imposing a symmetric penalty is somewhat akin to doubling the reward. I believe that 
penalties merely accelerate the learning process. 
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Is average claim level still inversely related to the reward parameter? If so, will 
the reward alone be sufficient incentive, in practice, to drive play to the Nash 
equilibrium? It is possible that the penalty serves as a reinforcement mechanism, 
effectively speeding the rate of convergence. On the other hand, its inclusion may blur or 
shift subjects' focus away from the strategically critical elements of the traveler's 
dilemma. 
IV. Methodology 
The instructions for this experiment are based in large measure on the instructions 
developed by CG. Four experimental sessions were conducted using 10 participants each 
session. A separate set of instructions was used for each session. Four treatments were 
used (with and without social context and with and without the penalty parameter, see 
Table 2). Social context was introduced by including the original traveler's dilemma 
parable in the experiment's instructions. Penalties were removed simply by omitting 
those portions of the instructions that described how and when penalties were to be 
administered. When the penalty was present it was symmetrical to the reward. 
Table 2 
Treatment I 
No Social Context Social Context 
Treatment II Penalty Session I Session" 
No Penalty Session III Session IV 
~----------~~~~~--~ 
Subjects were recruited from the student body at Oberlin College to participate in 
a "decision making experiment." Average earnings were advertised as $8.00 per student 
of which $3.00 was guaranteed for attending. The duration of the experiment was 
11 
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advertised as approximately one hour, although all four sessions ran between 10 and 20 
minutes over. 
Upon arrival, subjects were assigned to evenly separated seats facing exterior 
classroom walls to discourage subject interaction. Subjects completed a ring test prior to 
beginning the traveler's dilemma experiment. 13 The ring test measures predisposition 
towards cooperation and was included in association with an ongoing study by Professor 
Robert Piron. I do' not make use of the data collected by the ring test in this paper. 
Following the ring test the appropriate instructions for a particular session were 
read (see Appendix A) and any questions were answered prior to proceeding. Subjects 
were asked to submit integer-valued claims between 80 and 120 laboratory dollars. 
Laboratory dollars are an artificial currency which was converted to U.S. dollars at the 
end of each session using an exchange rate designed to exhaust the budget for each 
session. The total budget for each session was $80.00 of which $50.00 was awarded 




Decision sheets were collected after each round (see Appendix B for a sample 
decision sheet) and subjects randomly paired. Lab assistants calculated and recorded the 
"other person's claim," "lower claim," "penalty or reward," and "earnings" in the 
appropriate column before returning the decision sheets. 14 Earnings were calculated by 
taking the lower of the two claims and adding the appropriate reward for the lower 
13 Liebrand, W. B. G. "The Effect of Social Motive, Communication and Group Size on Behaviour in an N-
person Multi-Stage Mixed Motive Game." European Journal of Social Psychology, 14, pp. 230-264. 
14 Sessions III and IV had instead a column labeled "reward." 
12 
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claimant and subtracting a symmetrical penalty (when applicable) to the higher claimant. 
An exit survey was administered following the final round of play while earnings were 
calculated (Appendix C). 
Sessions consisted of two parts (Parts A and B) lasting ten rounds each. During 
each round, subjects participated in a traveler's dilemma with different, randomly 
selected subjects. Session II assigned, to all subjects, a low penalty/reward (10 laboratory 
dollars) during Part A and a high penalty/reward (80 laboratory dollars) during Part B. 
The order was reversed during Session N where Part A became the high reward and Part 
B the low reward. This was the sole difference between Parts A and B for these two 
sessions; however, subjects did not know this fact in advance. Subjects were informed 
only that Part A would be followed by "another decision making experiment." Session I 
assigned a high penalty/reward for both parts and Session III assigned a low reward for 
both parts as a control. The reversal of penalty/reward levels allowed sequence effects to 
be isolated. CG were able to cancel sequence effects directly (across sessions) since their 
instructions remained constant for all sessions. It is possible to isolate sequence effects 
across sessions even though the instructions changed because regression analysis is used. 
Subjects were explicitly informed that the person with whom they were to be randomly 
matched always faced an identical penalty/reward structure. 
The issue of saliency, or whether the reward generates the appropriate utility in 
subjects, arises when experiments are conducted using artificial monetary units. It has 
been theorized that using a laboratory currency can "mask or even dilute financial 
13 
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incentives,,15 because individuals don't fully grasp the underlying value. Holt and 
Douglas remark that "it is probably prudent to denominate laboratory earnings in cash, 
unless the researcher has a specific design motivation for using a laboratory currency.,,16 
I believe that when subjects clearly understand that an increase in laboratory 
dollar earnings translates into a proportional increase in monetary compensation the 
underlying financial incentives remain intact. This is particularly germane in an 
experimental setting because subjects are solicited to attend using monetary incentives. I 
feel that it is reasonable to assume that those who attend will pursue earning-maximizing 
behavior to the extent that they understand the reward structure. It is therefore incumbent 
upon the experimenter to explain carefully what the use of a laboratory currency implies. 
I concede that when the exchange rate is unknown an individual may not know the 
marginal benefit achieved for expending effort in an attempt to earn more laboratory 
dollars; however, when subjects attempt to maximize their earnings, larger laboratory 
dollar denominated rewards should evoke greater effort. I found it necessary to utilize this 
method to avoid exceeding my budget. 
It is important to note that I have assumed that individuals who were exposed to 
the traveler's dilemma parable did actually consider it when making their decisions. Any 
conclusions that are made about the effect of adding social context hinges on this 
assumption. Although reasons exist why this assumption may not hold I do not believe 
that it is feasible to conduct this experiment is such a way that this problem is 
15 Davis, Douglas D. and Holt, Charles A. Experimental Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
pp. 26. 
16 Ibid. pp. 26. 
14 
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circumvented. Moreover, this technique has been used before to investigate similar 
issues. 
By default the method of hypothetical choices emerges as the simplest procedure by 
which a large number of theoretical questions can be investigated. The use of the method 
relies on the assumption that people often know how they would behave in actual 
situations, and on the further assumption that the subject would have no special reason to 
disguise their true preferences. I7 
The above assumption may be violated if individuals have an incentive to ignore 
the hypothetical situation because they feel it may affect their earnings. They may 
be capable of ignoring the social context in a hypothetical situation whereas they 
could not in a real-world situation. This could disguise their true preference. I 
feel that if experimental evidence is found that social context, introduced as a 
hypothetical, can influence subjects' decisions then the effect on real-world 
decisions where actual social context is present may be greater (the contextual 
incentives are likely to be more immediate). 
CG used a continuous claim space in their experiment. I elected to use a 
discrete claim space instead. The two motivations for this choice were (1) an 
acknowledgement of human proclivities and (2) simplicity. Individuals often 
round to a somewhat arbitrary degree for simplification. By specifying the 
minimum degree to which rounding was allowed to take place I hope to have 
eliminated some "noise" in my data. Examination of the CG data reveal when 
given the opportunity subjects do not consistently specify their claim to the 
maximum degree possible. In addition, the use of integers reduced the difficulty 
of the earnings calculations and diminished the chance of human error. 
17 Kahneman, Daniel and Tversky, Amos. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk." 
Econometrica, March 1979,47(2), pp. 265 . 
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v. Data 
The data are summarized in Chart 1. Claims are averaged across subjects 
and plotted by round. The discontinuity between Rounds 10 and 11 emphasizes 
the treatment change (if any) between Part A and Part B. Each session is labeled 
with its treatment variables for clarity. For example, Session I, Part A labeled 
NSC P=80 indicates no social context, penalty present, and a high reward level 
while Session IV, Part B labeled SC R=lO indicates social context, no penalty 
present, and a low reward level. 
It appears that the general result of the CG experiment (average claim is 
inversely proportional to penalty/reward level) holds for Sessions I and ill. 
Session ill immediately converges toward the maximum allowed claim and 
remains high throughout the session. Average claims in Session I, while much 
lower, do not converge completely to the Nash equilibrium. (Recall that the Nash 
equilibrium response is 80 for all sessions.) However, when individual averages 
are examined (see Table 3) it is apparent that Subject 3 and Subject 4 have 
unusually high averages. Further, both subjects exhibit non-strategic behavior, 
that is, repeated submission of the same losing claim, during most or all of their 
responses. 18 When these responses are removed the average drops approximately 
20 dollars per round and lies much closer to the Nash equilibrium (see Chart 2). 
When the outliers are removed the cross subject average drops from 118.0 to 
99.84 and the standard deviation of average claims drops from 39.3 to 8.8. 
16 
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Unfortunately, this does not remove interaction effects that could continue to bias 
the average upwards and contribute to the greater degree of fluctuation. 
Table 3 Per Person Claim Average by Session 
Session I Session II Session III Session IV 
Subject 1 105.5 103.5 193.85 129.35 
Subject 2 112.45 105.95 170.75 148.6 
Subject 3 200 120.05 186.95 131.65 
Subject 4 181.4 142.65 180.75 98.5 
Subject 5 87 84.5 188.6 101.75 
Subject 6 91.4 88.5 194.55 133.65 
Subject 7 106.25 98 191.25 101.5 
Subject 8 105.05 124.9 184.05 153.25 
Subject 9 97.55 161 192.3 84.65 
Subject 10 93.55 107.75 194.85 113.05 
Average 118.02 113.68 187.79 119.6 
SD 39.33 23.98 7.6 23.01 
One simple method that may eliminate the upward bias is to make use of 
the reinforcement learning theory considered by CG. 19 The basic idea is that 
subjects' claims in round t should move in the direction of the best response to the 
claim of the person with whom they were matched in round t-1. This implies that 
eliminating subjects' claims which immediately follow a round in which they 
were matched with Subject 3 or Subject 4 will remove some of the interaction 
effect and consequently reduce the average and the variance. The cross-subject 
average drops to 95.4 and the standard deviation of average claims to 6.2 (see 
Chart 3). In addition to the issue that some subjects may not follow this pattern, 
this technique is also imperfect in that it only accounts for first order shocks. 
18 Subject 3 submitted 200 during all 20 rounds. Subject 4 submitted 200 for all rounds in Part A and 190 
or greater during 6 out of 10 rounds in Part B. Subject 4 only submitted the lower claim 4 times. 
19 Selten R., and Buchta, J. "Experimental Sealed Bid First Price Auctions with Directly Observed Bid 
Functions" University of Bonn Discussion PaperB-270, 1994 as used in Capra, Monica M., Goeree, Jacob 
K., et al. "Anomalous Behavior in a Traveler's Dilemma?" UnpUblished, September 1997. 
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There is a clear, symmetric reversal of average claim between Parts A and 
B of Sessions IT and IV i.e., when the magnitude of the penalty/reward parameter 
is allowed to change. This is also consistent with the general result that average 
claims are inversely related to the magnitude of the penalty/reward. When the 
penalty/reward parameter is large (Session Ill, Session IT, Part B and Session IV, 
Part A) average claims are uniformly lower than average claims for which the 
penalty/reward parameter is small (Session I, Session IT, Part A and Session IV, 
Part B). The fact that the magnitude of the reversal between Parts A and B of 
Sessions IT and IV is roughly symmetrical is very intriguing. Unfortunately, other 
parameters are changing and it is difficult to determine what portion of the shift is 
associated with the sequence effect and what portion is due to the change from 
penalty and reward to reward only. 
Notice that the reversal occurs in Session IV even though there is no 
penalty. This indicates that the reward incentive is strong enough, absent a 
penalty, to achieve the expected results. Possible evidence that the penalty/reward 
parameter may serve to reinforce the reward, as previously suggested, is shown in 
Sessions IT and IV. A priori, one would expect the first rounds of Session IV, Part 
B to be lower than Session IT, Part A due to sequence effects yet this is not true. 
Taking the average claims for which the penalty/reward parameter is small 
as a group exposes the fact that average claims are much lower when social 
context is present (Sessions IT, Part A and Session Ill, Part B). This is precisely 
the opposite of what I anticipated. I hypothesized that introducing social context 
would increase the incentive to cooperate thus making the expected effect 
18 
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positive. It is less clear what effect social context has on average claims for which 
the penalty/reward is high. It appears to decrease the level of average claims on 
Chart 1, have no effect on Chart 2, and increase the level on Chart 3. 
I am unable to estimate numerically or construct confidence intervals for 
conclusions drawn from the graphical representation of the data. Nonetheless, it 
is observable that average claims are inversely related to penalty/reward parameter 
and the reward alone, the penalty reinforces the reward, social context has a 
negative impact, and the sequence effect appears to be symmetrical. To accurately 
separate the effects of the treatment variables I must now tum to regression 
analysis. On a positive note, the main characteristics of the data are consistent 
with previous work (see Chart 4 for a direct comparison). 
VI. Regression Results 
The first model that I consider is the simplest. The four experimental 
treatments are coded as dichotomous variables and then regressed on individual 
claims. The penalty/reward parameter is decomposed into two parts: PENALTY, 
indicating the presence of a symmetric penalty, and LEVEL, indicating the 
magnitude of the reward. The sequence effect can be measured as two separate 
effects or it can be combined into one variable. Using either specification is 
acceptable. The only significant difference is the expected sign on the coefficient. 
The coefficient on the dichotomous variable for the sequence effect going from a 
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low initial penalty/reward to a high penalty/reward should be positive.2o The 
opposite holds for the sign on the coefficient for the sequence effect going from a 
low initial penalty/reward to a high penalty/reward. The sequence effect is 
computed both ways during the first regression as a check. Table 4 explains how 
the dichotomous variables are constructed. The experimental parameters are the 
same for all subjects in a given part; therefore, the dummy variables are always 
the same for all subjects in a given part. Lastly a dummy variable is created in 









Explanation of Dichotomous Variables 
Session I Session II Session III Session IV 
Part A Part B Part A Part B Part A L Part B Part A I Part B 
o 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1 1 1 1 0 000 
o 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
o 000 0 001 
o 0 0 1 0 0 0 -1 
SOCIAL CONTEXT = 1 if social context is present 
LEVEL = 1 if the penalty/reward level is high 
PENAL TV = 1 if there is a penalty 
SEQUENCE H_L = 1 if the penalty/reward goes from high (80) to low (10) 
SEQUENCE L_H = 1if the penalty/reward goes from low (10) to high (80) 
SEQUENCE_EFFECT = 1 if the sequence effect goes from high to low, -1 
if the effect goes from low to high, and 0 if there is no change between 
Part A and B 
Bias = 1 if the subject was paired with Subject 3 or 4 in the prior round 
CLAIMit=a 0+ ~ l·SociaIContext+ ~ 2·Penalty + ~ 3-Level+ ~ 4·SequenceEffect + ~ S·Bias 
20 This may sound contrary to what was previously stated about sequence effects. The confusion is a matter 
of semantics, keep in mind that a low penalty/reward induces high average claims. 
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Included observations: 800 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
e 183.92 2.48 74.11 0.000 
SOCIAL_CONTEXT -35.64 2.71 -13.13 0.000 
PENALTY -26.12 3.79 -6.89 0.000 
LEVEL -37.17 3.26 -11.41 0.000 
SEQUENCE_EFFECT 12.46 3.26 3.83 0.000 
BIAS 7.40 6.96 1.06 0.288 
Adjusted R-squared 0.42 Mean dependent var 134.770 
S.E. of regression 37.46 S.D.dependentvar 49.220 
Sum squared resid 1113889.00 F-statistic 117.158 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.82 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
e 183.92 2.48 74.06 0.000 
SOCIAL_CONTEXT -35.62 3.30 -10.80 0.000 
PENALTY -26.12 3.79 -6.88 0.000 
LEVEL -37.17 3.26 -11.41 0.000 
SEQUENCE_L_H 12.44 4.97 2.50 0.013 
SEQUENCE_H_L -12.49 4.97 -2.5.1 0.012 
BIAS 7.40 6.97 1.06 0.288 
Adjusted R-squared 0.42 Mean dependent var 134.770 
S.E. of regression 37.48 S.D. dependentvar 49.220 
Sum squared resid 1113889.00 F-statistic 97.508 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.82 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
The penalty, level, and sequence effect coefficients are all highly 
significant and have the expected sign. The negative coefficient on penalty is 
consistent with the supposition that the penalty reinforces the reward-driven 
incentive to submit low claims. The negative coefficient on level reinforces the 
conclusion that claim level is inversely related to the magnitude of the reward. 
The low to high and high to low sequence effects are roughly symmetrical, posses 
the expected signs, and are significant at about the 10% level. When the sequence 
effect is consolidated into a single variable it becomes highly significant. 
It remains puzzling that social context has a highly significant, negative 
impact. Although I do not have a definitive explanation of why social context did 
not contribute to cooperation, subsequent reflection has yielded one possible 
explanation. "Social context" is an ambiguous term representing a host of 
personal and societal influences. I believe that the crux of the problem is the 
2 1 
assumption of the type of social context that was introduced. I implicitly assumed 
that it would evoke a feeling of solidarity among subjects?l It is possible that 
introducing the parable caused subjects to scrutinize their fellow traveler's 
position more carefully and as a result introduced what I will call the "specter of 
competition." The manner in which subjects interacted coupled with the parable 
may have given rise to feelings of mistrust. Instead of considering their fellow 
traveler as a guiltless human being confronting a similar misfortune, subjects may 
have cast the person with whom they were matched in the role of a competitor for 
the same reward. I do not present this as a conclusive explanation although it 
does explain why social context did not have as much effect when the 
penalty/reward parameter was large. In this case sufficient incentive to motivate 
competitive behavior already exists. Disregarding the counterintuitive negative 
sign, I can conclude (un surprisingly) that social context does matter but that the 
exact nature of the social context is not easily determined. 
The coefficient on bias indicates that interaction with the Subjects 3 and 4 
did have a positive effect on claims in the following round. The coefficient is 
small relative to its standard error and therefore it is only significant at the 30% 
level. The model can explain nearly half of the variation in the claim data 
- , 
(R - = .42). Unfortunately, the Durbin-Watson statistic indicates that there is 
positive, first order serial correlation. The presence of serial correlation implies 
that the standard errors are biased downward and the estimated coefficients are no 
21 Especially given that the subjects are Oberlin students .. 
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longer efficient. The basic specification is next computed using a first order 
autoregressive correction technique. 
Included observations: 799 after adjusting endpoints 
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Correcting for first order serial correlation does not drastically change the 
estimated coefficients. The upward bias is actually more significant although the 
sequence effect is now only significant at the 10% level. A substantial 
-7 
improvement has occurred in the explanatory power of the model ( R - = .63 ). 
Ideally I would now like to include dichotomous variables for each subject 
and round in order to separate out the person and time effects. Unfortunately I 
cannot include every tenth dichotomous person variable because this creates 
perfect multicolinerity. I chose to eliminate the first subject from each session. 
The interpretation of the coefficient on the person becomes the amount by which 
Subject; differs from the first subject in that session. The first time round is, of 
course, omitted to avoid a similar linear dependency problem. The coefficient on 
the time dummy has a straightforward interpretation; the amount by which round; 
differs from Round 1. The regression results are fairly lengthy due to the number 
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regression is first estimated using ordinary least squares and then the correction 
for serial correlation is applied. 
CLAM it=a 0+ J3 l ·SociaIContext+ J3 2 ,Penalty + J3 3·Level + J3 4·SequenceEffect + J3 S·Bias 
... + J3 6·Subject2 t+ .. · J3 40·Subject39 t+ J3 41,Period2 i+'" J3 S9·Period20i 
The person effects are not terribly interesting in and of themselves; rather 
they serve to control for the idiosyncrasies of particular subjects. It is 
confirmation to note that the coefficients for Subjects 3 and 4 are significant, 
positive, and larger than all other person coefficients. This reinforces the 
conclusion that a substantial amount of their behavior is exogenously determined. 
The time variables illustrate an interesting trend. During the initial rounds 
the coefficients are mostly negative but largely insignificant. After Round l3 the 
coefficients are uniformly negative and, with the exception of Round 16, 
significant at the 11 % level or less. (Round 16 is unusual because of an unrelated, 
simultaneous occurrence of high claims in Sessions I and II.). This pattern 
evinces a tendency towards negative convergence. Learning that drives play 
toward a "sticky" level that is closer to the Nash equilibrium than the initial round 
is on possible explanation for this phenomenon. There is some ambiguity because 
the Durbin-Watson statistic indicated positive serial correlation. 
VII. Conclusion 
Nash equilibrium solutions are a powerful, commonly accepted manner by 
which game theoretic questions are answered. This technique, like any other, has 
its shortcomings. There are games in which the Nash equilibrium solution is 
24 
-
counterintuitive and therefore a poor predictor of actual behavior. The traveler' s 
dilemma is one such game. 
The description of the traveler's dilemma given by Basu contains both a 
penalty parameter and social context. The penalty parameter is unnecessary and 
insufficient to derive the Nash equilibrium. Social context, while strategically 
irrelevant, constitutes an important part of the motivation in the parable version of 
the traveler's dilemma. 
I have found that when only a reward is present the incentive to submit 
lower claims is preserved. The presence of a penalty does have a reinforcing 
effect. Inducing a predetermined brand of social context is a complex matter. 
Social context influences our daily decisions in subtle and often unrecognized 
ways. The effect of social context is undeniable ex post facto but predicting the 
precise nature in which different groups of individuals will perceive and react to 
any set of social circumstances is perilous indeed. I erroneously assumed that I 




Instructions for Session I 
You are going to take part in an experimental study of decision making. The 
funding for this study has been provided by The Jerome Davis Research Fund. By 
following the instructions carefully, you may earn a considerable amount of money. At 
this time, you will be given $3 for coming on time. All the money that you earn 
subsequently will be yours to keep, and your earnings will be paid to you in cash at the 
end of this experiment. We will start by reading the instructions, and then you will have 
the opportunity to ask questions about the procedures described. 
Earnings 
This part of the experiment consists of ten rounds and will be immediately 
followed by another decision making experiment. In each round, you will be randomly 
matched with another participant in the room. The decisions that you and the other 
participant make will determine the amount earned by each of you. At the beginning of 
each round, you will choose a number or "claim" between 80 and 200 laboratory dollars. 
(Laboratory dollars will be converted into real currency at the end of the experiment 
using an exchange rate determined by the experimenter. This ensures that the budget is 
not exceeded. However, we will exhaust the entire budget for this experiment. The 
average amount earned will equal the budget divided by the number of participants 
present today or $8. To clarify, one laboratory dollar will be worth less than $1 but, 
since the total amount of money to be distributed is fixed, the more laboratory dollars you 
earn the more cash you will receive at the end of the experiment.) Claims will be made 
by writing any amount between and including 80 and 200 laboratory dollars. The person 
with whom you are matched will also make a claim between and including 80 and 200 
laboratory dollars. If the claims are equal, then you and the other person each will 
receive the amount claimed. If the claims are not equal, then each of you will receive the 
lower of the two claims. In addition, the person who makes the lower claim will earn a 
reward and the person with the higher claim will pay a penalty. The reward and penalty 
for you and the person with whom you are matched will always be the same. For 
example, you could earn an amount that equals the lower of the two claims, plus an 80 
laboratory dollar reward if you are the person making the lower claim, or the lower of the 
two claims minus an 80 laboratory dollar penalty if you are the person making the higher 
claim. There is no penalty or reward if the two claims are exactly equal, in which case 
each person receives what they claimed. 
Example 1: Suppose your claim is 10 laboratory dollars, the person with whom you 
are matched claims 8 laboratory dollars, the penalty is -2 laboratory 
dollars, and the reward is +2 laboratory dollars. 
The person with whom you are matched has made the lower claim, 
therefore, you will receive the lower claim minus the penalty or $8 - $2 = 
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$6. The person with whom you are matched will receive the lower claim 
plus the reward or $8 + $2 = $10. 
Example 2: Suppose your claim is 8 laboratory dollars, the person with whom you are 
matched claims 10 laboratory dollars, the penalty is -2 laboratory dollars, 
and the reward is +2 laboratory dollars. 
You have made the lower claim, therefore, you will receive the lower 
claim plus the reward or $8 + $2 = $10. The person with whom you are 
matched will receive the lower claim minus the penalty or $8 - $2 = $6. 
Remember that claims must be greater than or equal to 80 laboratory dollars and less 
than or equal to 200 laboratory dollars. Are there any questions about how earnings are 
determined? 
Record of Results 
Now, each of you should examine the record sheet for part A. This sheet is the 
second to last one attached to these instructions. Your identification number is written in 
the top-right part of this sheet. Please look at the columns of your record sheet for part A. 
Going from left to right, you will see columns labeled "round," "your claim," "other 
person's claim," "lower claim," penalty or reward (if any), and "your earnings." The 
amount in the column labeled penalty or reward is the laboratory dollar amount that will 
be added to or subtracted from the lower claim to determine your earnings. You begin by 
writing down your own claim in the appropriate column. As mentioned above, this claim 
must be greater than or equal to 80 laboratory dollars and less than or equal to 200 
laboratory dollars, and the claim may be any integer amount in this range (i.e., 80, 81, 82, 
... , 199,200). 
After you record your decision for round one, we will collect all decision sheets. 
We will then match each of you with another person using computer generated random 
numbers. After we have randomly matched someone with you, we will write the other 
person's claim, the lower claim, the penalty or reward, and your earnings in the relevant 
columns of your decision sheet and return it to you. Then you will be asked to make and 
record your decision for round two, we will collect all the decision sheets, randomly 
match you with another person, write that other person's claim, lower claim, penalty or 
reward, and earnings in your decision sheet and return it to you. This process will be 
repeated for a total of ten rounds. 
Final Remarks 
At the end of today's session, we will pay to you, in real cash, the amount that 
you have earned. We will add together your earnings from all parts of this experiment to 
determine your total earnings (earnings will be rounded to the nearest 25 cent amount in 
U.S, dollars, after conversion). You have already received the $3 participation payment. 
Therefore, if you earn 2,800 laboratory dollars during the exercise that follows, you will 
receive a total amount of $3.00 + 2,800·r (where r is the conversion rate of laboratory 
dollars to U.S. dollars). Your earnings are your own business, and you do not have to 
discuss them with anyone. 
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During the experiment, please do not speak or communicate with the other 
participants. If you have a question while the experiment is going on, raise your hand 
and one of the experimenters will come to your desk to answer it. At this time, do you 
have any questions about the instruction or procedures? If you have a question please 
raise your hand now. 
Instructions (part B) 
A decision sheet for part B is on the last page after these instructions. Part B will 
be identical to. As before, you will write a claim amount in the left column and, in each 
round, you will be randomly matched with another participant, who will also make a 
claim. You will receive an amount that equals the lower of your claim and the other 
person's claim minus a penalty if you have the higher claim and plus a reward if you 
have the lower claim. There is no penalty or reward if you claim the same amount as the 
person with whom you are matched. Claims must be greater than or equal to 80 
laboratory dollars and less than or equal to 200 laboratory dollars, and the claim may be 
any integer amount in this range. 
Instructions for Session II 
You are going to take part in an experimental study of decision making. The 
funding for this study has been provided by The Jerome Davis Research Fund. By 
following the instructions carefully, you may earn a considerable amount of money. At 
this time, you will be given $3 for coming on time. All the money that you earn 
subsequently will be yours to keep, and your earnings will be paid to you in cash at the 
end of this experiment. We will start by reading the instructions, and then you will have 
the opportunity to ask questions about the procedures described. 
Earnings 
This part of the experiment consists of ten rounds and will be immediately 
followed by another decision making experiment. In each round, you will be randomly 
matched with another participant in the room. The decisions that you and the other 
participant make will determine the amount earned by each of you. You are asked to 
consider the following hypothetical scenario. You and the person that you are matched 
with have just returned from a vacation. During this vacation you purchased identical 
souvenirs from the same store. These souvenirs were destroyed during your flight by the 
airline. You are asked by the airline claim agent to submit a claim in order to be 
compensated for your loss. Because you did not purchase special insurance for the 
damaged items the maximum amount that you can receive is 200 dollars and it is well 
known that the airline does not dispute claims of 80 dollars and below. If you both 
submit the same claim you receive the amount of your claim as compensation. However 
the claim agent, in an effort to prevent inflated claims, stipulates that if either of you 
submits a claim which is lower than the other's then both of you will receive the smaller 
claim. In addition, the traveler who submits the lower claim will receive a reward for 











for their presumed dishonesty. At the beginning of each round, you will choose a number 
or "claim" between 80 and 200 laboratory dollars. (Laboratory dollars will be converted 
into real currency at the end of the experiment using an exchange rate determined by the 
experimenter. This ensures that the budget is not exceeded. However, we will exhaust 
the entire budget for this experiment. The average amount earned will equal the budget 
divided by the number of participants present today or $8. To clarify, one laboratory 
dollar will be worth less than $1 but, since the total amount of money to be distributed is 
fixed, the more laboratory dollars you earn the more cash you will receive at the end of 
the experiment.) Claims will be made by writing any amount between and including 80 
and 200 laboratory dollars. The person with whom you are matched will also make a 
claim between and including 80 and 200 laboratory dollars. If the claims are equal, then 
you and the other person each will receive the amount claimed. If the claims are not 
equal, then each of you will receive the lower of the two claims. In addition, the person 
who makes the lower claim will earn a reward and the person with the higher claim will 
pay a penalty. The reward and penalty for you and the person with whom you are 
matched will always be the same. For example, you could earn an amount that equals the 
lower of the two claims, plus an 80 laboratory dollar reward if you are the person making 
the lower claim, or the lower of the two claims minus an 80 laboratory dollar penalty if 
you are the person making the higher claim. There is no penalty or reward if the two 
claims are exactly equal, in which case each person receives what they claimed. 
Example 1: Suppose your claim is 10 laboratory dollars, the person with whom you 
are matched claims 8 laboratory dollars, the penalty is -2 laboratory 
dollars, and the reward is +2 laboratory dollars. 
The person with whom you are matched has made the lower claim, 
therefore, you will receive the lower claim minus the penalty or $8 - $2 = 
$6. The person with whom you are matched will receive the lower claim 
plus the reward or $8 + $2 = $10 .. 
Example 2: Suppose your claim is 8 laboratory dollars, the person with whom you are 
matched claims 1 0 laboratory dollars, the penalty is -2 laboratory dollars, 
and the reward is +2 laboratory dollars. 
You have made the lower claim, therefore, you will receive the lower 
claim plus the reward or $8 + $2 = ~10. The person with whom you are 
matched will receive the lower claim minus the penalty or $8 - $2 = $6. 
Remember that claims must be greater than or equal to 80 laboratory dollars and less 
than or equal to 200 laboratory dollars. Are there any questions about how earnings are 
determined? 
Record of Results 
Now, each of you should examine the record sheet for part A. This sheet is the 
second to last one attached to these instructions. Your identification number is written in 
the top-right part of this sheet. Please look at the columns of your record sheet for part A. 
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Going from left to right, you will see columns labeled "round," "your claim," "other 
person's claim," "lower claim," penalty or reward (if any), and "your earnings." The 
amount in the column labeled penalty or reward is the laboratory dollar amount that will 
be added to or subtracted from the lower claim to determine your earnings. You begin by 
writing down your own claim in the appropriate column. As mentioned above, this claim 
must be greater than or equal to 80 laboratory dollars and less than or equal to 200 
laboratory dollars, and the claim may be any integer amount in this range (i.e., 80, 81, 82, 
... , 199,200). 
After you record your decision for round one, we will collect all decision sheets. 
We will then match each of you with another person using computer generated random 
numbers. After we have randomly matched someone with you, we will write the other 
person's claim, the lower claim, the penalty or reward, and your earnings in the relevant 
columns of your decision sheet and return it to you. Then you will be asked to make and 
record your decision for round two, we will collect all the decision sheets, randomly 
match you with another person, write that other person's claim, lower claim, penalty or 
reward, and earnings in your decision sheet and return it to you. This process will be 
repeated for a total of ten rounds. 
Final Remarks 
At the end of to day's session, we will pay to you, in real cash, the amount that 
you have earned. We will add together your earnings from all parts of this experiment to 
determine your total earnings (earnings will be rounded to the nearest 25 cent amount in 
U.S. dollars, after conversion). You have already received the $3 participation payment. 
Therefore, if you earn 2,800 laboratory dollars during the exercise that follows, you will 
receive a total amount of $3.00 + 2,800·r (where r is the conversion rate of laboratory 
dollars to U.S. dollars). Your earnings are your own business, and you do not have to 
discuss them with anyone. 
During the experiment, please do not speak or communicate with the other 
participants. If you have a question while the experiment is going on, raise your hand 
and one of the experimenters will come to your desk to answer it. At this time, do you 
have any questions about the instruction or procedures? If you have a question please 
raise your hand now. 
Instructions (part B) 
A decision sheet for part B is on the last page after these instructions. Part B will 
be identical to part A, with the exception that the reward and penalty amounts have been 
changed. As before, you will write a claim amount in the left column and, in each round, 
you will be randomly matched with another participant, who will also make a claim. You 
will receive an amount that equals the lower of your claim and the other person's claim 
minus a penalty if you have the higher claim and plus a reward if you have the lower 
claim. There is no penalty or reward if you claim the same amount as the person with 
whom you are matched. Claims must be greater than or equal to 80 laboratory dollars 
and less than or equal to 200 laboratory dollars, and the claim may be any integer amount 
in this range. 
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Instructions for Session III 
You are going to take part in an experimental study of decision making. The 
funding for this study has been provided by The Jerome Davis Research Fund. By 
following the instructions carefully, you may earn a considerable amount of money. At 
this time, you will be given $3 for coming on time. All the money that you earn 
subsequently will be yours to keep, and your earnings will be paid to you in caSh at the 
end of this experiment. We will start by reading the instructions, and then you will have 
the opportunity to ask questions about the procedures described. 
Earnings 
This part of the experiment consists of ten rounds and will be immediately 
followed by another decision making experiment. In each round, you will be randomly 
matched with another participant in the room. The decisions that you and the other 
participant make will determine the amount earned by each of you. At the beginning of 
each round, you will choose a number or "claim" between 80 and 200 laboratory dollars. 
(Laboratory dollars will be converted into real currency at the end of the experiment 
using an exchange rate determined by the experimenter. This ensures that the budget is 
not exceeded. However, we will exhaust the entire budget for this experiment. The 
average amount earned will equal the budget divided by the number of participants 
present today or $8. To clarify, one laboratory dollar will be worth less than $1 but, 
since the total amount of money to be distributed is fixed, the more laboratory dollars you 
earn the more cash you will receive at the end of the experiment.) Claims will be made 
by writing any amount between and including 80 and 200 laboratory dollars. The person 
with whom you are matched will also make a claim between and including 80 and 200 
laboratory dollars. If the claims are equal, then you and the other person each will 
receive the amount claimed. If the claims are not equal, then each of you will receive the 
lower of the two claims. In addition, the person who makes the lower claim will earn a 
reward. The reward for you and the person with whom you are matched will always be 
the same. For example, you could earn an amount that equals the lower of the two 
claims, plus an 80 laboratory dollar reward if you are the person making the lower claim, 
or the lower of the two claims if you are the person making the higher claim. There is no 
reward if the two claims are exactly equal, in which case each person receives what they 
claimed. 
Example 1; Suppose your claim is 10 laboratory dollars, the person with whom you 
are matched claims 8 laboratory dollars, and the reward is +2 laboratory 
dollars. 
The person with whom you are matched has made the lower claim, 
therefore, you will receive the lower claim or $8. The person with whom 




Example 2: Suppose your claim is 8 laboratory dollars, the person with whom you are 
matched claims 10 laboratory dollars, and the reward is +2 laboratory 
dollars. 
You have made the lower claim, therefore, you will receive the lower 
claim plus the reward or $8 + $2 = $10. The person with whom you are 
matched will receive the lower claim or $8. 
Remember that claims must be greater than or equal to 80 laboratory dollars and less 
than or equal to 200 laboratory dollars. Are there any questions about how earnings are 
determined? 
Record of Results 
Now, each of you should examine the record sheet for part A. This sheet is the 
second to last one attached to these instructions. Your identification number is written in 
the top-right part of this sheet. Please look at the columns of your record sheet for part A. 
Going from left to right, you will see columns labeled "round," "your claim," "other 
person's claim," "lower claim," "reward" (if any), and "your earnings." The amount in 
the column labeled reward is the laboratory dollar amount that will be added to the lower 
claim to determine the lower claimant's earnings. You begin by writing down your own 
claim in the appropriate column. As mentioned above, this claim must be greater than or 
equal to 80 laboratory dollars and less than or equal to 200 laboratory dollars, and the 
claim may be any integer amount in this range (i.e., 80, 81, 82, ... , 199,200). 
After you record your decision for round one, we will collect all decision sheets. 
We will · then match each of you with another person using computer generated random 
numbers. After we have randomly matched someone with you, we will write the other 
person's claim, the lower claim, the reward, and your earnings in the relevant columns of 
your decision sheet and return it to you. Then you will be asked to make and record your 
decision for round two, we will collect all the decision sheets, randomly match you with 
another person, write that other person's claim, lower claim, reward, and earnings in your 
decision sheet and return it to you. This process will be repeated for a total of ten rounds. 
Final Remarks 
At the end of today' s session, we will pay to you, in real cash, the amount that 
you have earned. We will add together your earnings from all parts of this experiment to 
determine your total earnings (earnings will be rounded to the nearest 25 cent amount in 
U.S. dollars, after conversion). You have already received the $3 participation payment. 
Therefore, if you earn 2,800 laboratory dollars during the exercise that follows, you will 
receive a total amount of $3.00 + 2,800·r (where r is the conversion rate of laboratory 
dollars to U.S. dollars). Your earnings are your own business, and you do not have to 
discuss them with anyone. 
During the experiment, please do not speak or communicate with the other 
participants. If you have a question while the experiment is going on, raise your hand 
and one of the experimenters will come to your desk to answer it. At this time, do you 
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have any questions about the instruction or procedures? If you have a question please 
raise your hand now. 
Instructions (part B) 
A decision sheet for part B is on the last page after these instructions. Part B will 
be identical to part A. As before, you will write a claim amount in the left column and, in 
each round, you will be randomly matched with another participant, who will also make a 
claim. You will receive an amount that equals the lower of your claim and the other 
person's claim plus a reward if you have the lower claim. There is no reward if you 
claim the same amount as the person with whom you are matched or if you make the 
higher claim. Claims must be greater than or equal to 80 laboratory dollars and less than 
or equal to 200 laboratory dollars, and the claim may be any integer amount in this range. 
Instructions for Session IV 
You are going to take part in an experimental study of decision making. The 
funding for this study has been provided by The Jerome Davis Research Fund. By 
following the instructions carefully, you may earn a considerable amount of money. At 
this time, you will be given $3 for coming on time. All the money that you earn 
subsequently will be yours to keep, and your earnings will be paid to you in cash at the 
end of this experiment. We will start by reading the instructions, and then you will have 
the opportunity to ask questions about the procedures described. 
Earnings 
This part of the experiment consists of ten rounds and will be immediately 
followed by another decision making experiment In each round, you will be randomly 
matched with another participant in the room. The decisions that you and the other 
participant make will determine the amount earned by each of you. You are asked to 
consider the following hypothetical scenario. You and the person that you are matched 
with have just returned from a vacation. During this vacation you purchased identical 
souvenirs from the same store. These souvenirs were destroyed during your flight by the 
airline. You are asked by the airline claim agent to submit a claim in order to be 
compensated for your loss. Because you did not purchase special insurance for the 
damaged items the maximum amount that you can receive is 200 dollars and it is well 
known that the airline does not dispute claims of 80 dollars and below. If you both 
submit the same claim you receive the amount of your claim as compensation. However, 
the claim agent, in an effort to prevent inflated claims, stipulates that if either of you 
submits a claim which is lower than the other's then both of you will receive the smaller 
claim. In addition, the traveler who submits the lower claim will receive a reward for 
their presumed honesty. At the beginning of each round, you will choose a number or 
"claim" between 80 and 200 laboratory dollars. (Laboratory dollars will be converted 
into real currency at the end of the experiment using an exchange rate determined by the 
experimenter. This ensures that the budget is not exceeded. However, we will exhaust 
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the entire budget for this experiment. The average amount earned will equal the budget 
divided by the number of participants present today or $8. To clarify, one laboratory 
dollar will be worth less than $1 but, since the total amount of money to be distributed is 
fixed, the more laboratory dollars you earn the more cash you will receive at the end of 
the experiment.) Claims will be made by writing any amount between and including 80 
and 200 laboratory dollars. The person with whom you are matched will also make a 
claim between and including 80 and 200 laboratory dollars. If the claims are equal, then 
you and the other person each will receive the amount claimed. If the claims are not 
equal, then each of you will receive the lower of the two claims. In addition, the person 
who makes the lower claim will earn a reward. The reward for you and the person with 
whom you are matched will always be the same. For example, you could earn an amount 
that equals the lower of the two claims, plus an 80 laboratory dollar reward if you are the 
person making the lower claim, or simply the lower of the two claims if you are the 
person making the higher claim. There is no reward if the two claims are exactly equal, 
in which case each person receives what they claimed. 
Example 1: Suppose your claim is 10 laboratory dollars, the person with whom you 
are matched claims 8 laboratory dollars, and the reward is +2 laboratory 
dollars. 
The person with whom you are matched has made the lower claim, 
therefore, you will receive the lower claim or $8. The person with whom 
you are matched will receive the lower claim plus the reward or $8 + $2 = 
$10. 
Example 2: Suppose your claim is 8 laboratory dollars, the person with whom you are 
matched claims 10 laboratory dollars, and the reward is +2 laboratory 
dollars. 
You have made the lower claim, therefore, you will receive the lower 
claim plus the reward or $8 + $2 = $10. The person with whom you are 
matched will receive the lower claim or $8. 
Remember that claims must be greater than or equal to 80 laboratory dollars and less 
than or equal to 200 laboratory dollars. Are there any questions about how earnings are 
determined? 
Record of Results 
Now, each of you should examine the record sheet for part A. This sheet is the 
second to last one attached to these instructions. Your identification number is written in 
the top-right part of this sheet. Please look at the columns of your record sheet for part A. 
Going from left to right, you will see columns labeled "round," "your claim," "other 
person's claim," "lower claim," "reward" (if any), and "your earnings." The amount in 
the column labeled reward is the laboratory dollar amount that will be added to the lower 
claim to determine the lower claimant's earnings. You begin by writing down your own 
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equal to 80 laboratory dollars and less than or equal to 200 laboratory dollars, and the 
claim may be any integer amount in this range (i.e., 80, 81, 82, ... , 199,200). 
After you record your decision for round one, we will collect all decision sheets. 
We will then !patch each of you with another person using computer generated random 
numbers. After we have randomly matched someone with you, we will write the other 
person's claim, the lower claim, the reward, and your earnings in the relevant columns of 
your decision sheet and return it to you. Then you will be asked to make and record your 
decision for round two, we will collect all the decision sheets, randomly match you with 
another person, write that other person's claim, lower claim, reward, and earnings in y~>ur 
decision sheet and return it to you. This process will be repeated for a total of ten rounds. 
Final Remarks 
At the end of today' s session, we will pay to you, in real cash, the amount that 
you have earned. We will add together your earnings from all parts of this experiment to 
determine your total earnings (earnings will be rounded to the nearest 25 cent amount in 
U.S. dollars, after conversion). You have already received the $3 participation payment. 
Therefore, if you earn 2,800 laboratory dollars during the exercise that follows, you will 
receive a total amount of $3.00 + 2,800'r (where r is the conversion rate of laboratory 
dollars to U.S. dollars). Your earnings are your own business, and you do not have to 
discuss them with anyone. 
During the experiment, please do not speak or communicate with the other 
participants. If you have a question while the experiment is going on, raise your hand 
and one of the experimenters will come to your desk to answer it. At this time, do you 
have any questions about the instruction or procedures? If you have a question please 
raise your hand now. 
Instructions (part B) 
A decision sheet for part B is on the last page after these instructions. Part B will 
be identical to part A, with the exception that the reward amounts have been changed. As 
before, you will write a claim amount in the left column and, in each round, you will be 
randomly matched with another participant, who will also make a claim. You will 
receive an amount that equals the lower of your claim and the other person's claim plus a 
reward if you have the lower claim. There is no reward if you claim the same amount as 
the person with whom you are matched or if you make the higher claim. Claims must be 
greater than or equal to 80 laboratory dollars and less than or equal to 200 laboratory 
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These columns will be filled out by the experimenters. 
Penalty: -$10 















1) Do you feel that you understood the instructions? 
Yes No 
2) How much did you believe that you would earn (in U.S. dollars)? 
3) What year are you? 
1st Year 
2nd Year 1-----1 
3rd Year 
4th Year t-----I 
5th Year ....... _----' 
Subject: __ 
4) Briefly describe your thought process prior to your first claim in Part A. 
5) What is your major? 
6) Did you consciously round the amount that you claimed? If so, what units did you 
use for rounding (by even numbers, by fives, tens, etc.)? 
7) What is you annual family income? 
<$20,000 
>$20,000 but <$50,000 
>$50,000 but <$100,000 
>$100,000 1-----1 
Don't Know 




(sorry, not electronic) 
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Appendix E 
Included observations: 800 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
e 191.18 6.98 27.40 0.060 
SOCIAL_CONTEXT -31.66 6.29 -5.04 0.000 
PENALTY -43.11 6.43 -6.70 0.000 
LEVEL -31.16 2.74 -11.38 0.000 
SEQUENCE_EFFECT 24.93 8.33 2.99 0.003 
BIAS 21.23 5.34 3.97 0.000 
SUBJECT_2 -2.74 8.34 -0.33 0.742 
SUBJECT_3 86.93 8.33 10.44 0.000 
SUBJECT_4 68.33 8.33 8.21 0.000 
SUBJECT_5 -27.13 8.33 -3.26 0.001 
SUBJECT_6 -22.73 8.33 -2.73 0.007 
SUBJECTJ -10.00 8.36 -1.20 0.232 
SUBJECT_8 -10.14 8.34 -1.22 0.224 
SUBJECT_9 -16.58 8.33 -1.99 0.047 
SUBJECT_10 -22.70 8.36 -2.72 0.007 
SUBJECT_12 11.08 8.33 1.33 0.184 
SUBJECT_13 25.18 8.33 3.02 0.003 
SUBJECT_14 47.78 8.33 5.74 0.000 
SUBJECT_15 -10.37 8.33 -1 .25 0.214 
SUBJECT_16 -31 .30 12.55 -2.49 0.013 
SUBJECT_17 -21 .80 12.55 -1.74 0.083 
SUBJECT_18 5.10 12.55 0.41 0.685 
SUBJECL19 41.20 12.55 3.28 0.001 
SUBJECT_20 -12.05 12.55 -0.96 0.337 
SUBJECT_22 -14.47 8.33 -1.74 0.083 
SUBJECT_23 1.73 8.33 0.21 0.835 ,,, 
!t! SUBJECT_24 -4.47 8.33 
-0.54 0.592 
." SUBJECT_25 3.38 8.33 0.41 0.685 
ill SUBJECT_26 9.33 8.33 1.12 0.263 jli 
." SUBJECT_27 6.03 8.33 
0.72 0.469 
ill! 
SUBJECT_28 -1.17 8.33 -0.14 0.888 
1111 SUBJECT_29 7.08 8.33 0.85 0.396 
SUBJECT_30 9.63 8.33 1.16 0.248 
!: : ~ SUBJECT_32 10.62 8.33 1.28 
0.203 
"II SUBJECT_33 -6.33 8.33 -0.76 0.447 
iltl 
SUBJECT_34 -39.48 8.33 -4.74 0.000 
nil SUBJECT_35 -36.23 8.33 -4.35 0.000 
::t! SUBJECT_36 20.60 8.87 2.32 0.021 
:::i SUBJECT_37 -11.55 8.87 -1.30 
0.193 
Jill SUBJECT_38 40.20 8.87 4.53 0.000 II11 
"II SUBJECT_39 -28.40 8.87 -3.20 0.001 
Period_2 -8.21 6.28 -1.31 0.191 
Period_3 -5.29 6.28 -0.84 0.400 
Period_4 -5.14 6.28 -0.82 0.414 
Period_5 -10.54 6.28 -1 .68 0.094 
Period_6 -4.51 6.28 -0.72 0.473 
PeriodJ 0.54 6.28 0.09 0.932 
Period_8 -1 .94 6.28 -0.31 0.758 
Period_9 -2.59 6.28 -0.41 0.681 
Period_10 -2.29 6.28 -0.36 0.716 
Period_11 6.20 6.27 0.99 0.323 
Period_12 -4.64 6.28 -0.74 0.461 
Period_13 -6.68 6.27 -1.06 0.287 
Period_14 -10.71 6.28 -1.71 0.088 
Period_15 -12.56 6.27 -2.00 0.046 
Period_16 -4.13 6.27 -0.66 0.511 
Period_17 -11.74 6.28 -1.87 0.062 
Period_18 -11.06 6.28 -1.76 0.079 
Period_19 -11 .61 6.28 -1 .85 0.065 
Period 20 -12.27 6.29 -1 .95 0.051 
Adjusted R-squared 0.68 Mean dependent var 134.770 
S.E. of regression 28.05 S.D.dependentvar 49.220 
Sum squared resid 582306.40 F-statistic 29.151 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.43 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
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Included observations: 799 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 8 iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
e 191.29 8.49 22.54 0.000 
SOCIAL_CONTEXT -32.91 8.42 -3.91 0.000 
PENALTY -43.35 8.59 -5.04 0.000 
LEVEL -30.14 3.37 -8.94 0.000 
SEQUENCE_EFFECT 22.93 11.07 2.07 0.039 
BIAS 21.31 4.92 4.33 0.000 
SUBJECT_2 -5.37 11.07 -0.48 0.628 
SUBJECT_3 86.39 11.20 7.71 0.000 
SUBJECT_4 68.02 11.21 6.07 0.000 
SUBJECT_5 -31.34 11.21 -2.79 0.005 
SUBJECT_6 -23.50 11.20 -2.10 0.036 
SUBJECTJ -10.08 11.23 -0.90 0.370 
SUBJECT_8 -15.22 11.21 -1.36 0.175 
SUBJECT_9 -14.78 11.21 -1.32 0.188 
SUBJECT_10 -24.73 11.18 -2.21 0.027 
SUBJECT_12 10.36 10.90 0.95 0.342 
SUBJECT_13 27.02 11.05 2.45 0.015 
SUBJECT_14 45.60 11.05 4.13 0.000 
SUBJECT_15 -8.42 11.05 -0.76 0.446 
SUBJECT_16 -29.92 16.63 -1.80 0.072 
SUBJECT_17 -19.10 16.63 -1.15 0.251 
SUBJECT_18 5.39 16.63 0.32 0.746 
SUBJECT_19 42.95 16.63 2.58 0.010 
SUBJECT_20 -7.62 16.62 -0.46 0.647 
SUBJECT_22 -14.57 10.90 -1.34 0.182 
SUBJECT_23 -1.42 11.03 -0.13 0.898 
SUBJECT_24 -6.47 11.03 -0.59 0.558 
SUBJECT_25 2.93 11.03 0.27 0.791 
SUBJECT_26 8.36 11.03 0.76 0.449 
SUBJECT_27 6.63 11.03 0.60 0.548 
SUBJECT_28 0.04 11.03 0.00 0.997 
SUBJECT_29 3.12 11.04 0.28 0.777 
SUBJECT_30 9.06 11.00 0.82 0.410 
SUBJECT_32 11.14 10.90 1.02 0.308 
SUBJECT_33 -6.13 11.04 -0.55 0.579 
SUBJECT_34 -38.21 11.04 -3.46 0.001 
SUBJECT_35 -38.36 11.04 -3.47 0.001 
SUBJECT_36 20.76 11.77 1.76 0.078 
SUBJECT_37 -12.53 11.77 -1.06 0.288 
SUBJECT_38 36.79 11.76 3.13 0.002 
SUBJECT_39 -32.40 11.60 -2.79 0.005 
Period_2 -7.77 5.31 -1.46 0.144 
Period_3 -4.72 6.05 -0.78 0.436 
Period_4 -4.53 6.25 -0.72 0.469 
Period_5 -9.92 6.31 -1.57 0.117 
Period_6 -3.89 6.33 -0.61 0.539 
PeriodJ 1.16 6.34 0.18 0.854 
Period_8 -1.31 6.34 -0.21 0.836 
Period_9 -1.96 6.34 -0.31 0.757 
Period_10 -1.66 6.34 -0.26 0.793 
Period_11 6.83 6.33 1.08 0.281 
Period_12 -4.01 6.34 -0.63 0.527 
Period_13 -6.05 6.33 -0.96 0.340 
Period_14 -10.09 6.34 -1.59 0.112 
Period_15 -11.93 6.33 -1.88 0.060 
Period_16 -3.50 6.33 -0.55 0.580 
Period_17 -11.11 6.31 -1.76 0.079 
Period_18 -10.44 6.26 -1.67 0.096 
Period_19 -10.99 6.06 -1.81 0.070 
Period_20 -11.64 5.34 -2.18 0.030 
AR(1) 0.30 0.04 8.33 0.000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.70 Mean dependent var 134.776 
S.E. of regression 26.88 S.D.dependentvar 49.251 
Sum squared resid 533267.30 F-statistic 32.347 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.04 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
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